

Codebook

Systematic Measurement Error in Election Violence Data: Causes and Consequences
British Journal of Political Science

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This codebook describes the variables included in the replication datasets associated with the article “Systematic Measurement Error in Election Violence Data: Causes and Consequences British Journal of Political Science.” The article is associated with three datasets:

1. Borzyskowski Wahman Data combined.dta,
2. Borzyskowski Wahman Data for Figure A3.dta, and
3. Borzyskowski Wahman Data for Figures A4-A7.dta

The different datasets are described below.

DATASET 1: Borzyskowski Wahman Data combined.dta

Malawi

Label: Country Indicator

Country indicator for Malawi

RCODE

Label: Region Indicator

Numeric code for region (admin 1)

preday_EV

Label: MEMS/ZEMS pre-election violence

Indicates election-related violence in the constituency during the pre-election period or the day of the election according to the Malawi Election Monitor Survey (MEMS) or the Zambia Election Monitor Survey (ZEMS). The constituency is coded as having election violence if at least one of the three monitors report electoral violence.

Source: Wahman, Michael (2014) *Malawi Election Monitor Survey*. London School of Economics. and Wahman, Michael (2016) *Zambia Election Monitor Survey*. University of Missouri.

For use please cite: von Borzyskowski, Inken and Wahman, Michael. “Systematic Measurement Error in Election Violence Data: Causes and Consequences” British Journal of Political Science.

post_EV

Label: MEMS/ZEMS post-election violence

Indicates election-related violence in the constituency during the post-election period according to the Malawi Election Monitor Survey (MEMS) or the Zambia Election Monitor Survey (ZEMS). The constituency is coded as having election violence if at least one of the three monitors report electoral violence. The post-election period refers to the period from election day until two weeks after results were announced.

Source: Wahman, Michael (2014) *Malawi Election Monitor Survey*. London School of Economics. and Wahman, Michael (2016) *Zambia Election Monitor Survey*. University of Missouri.

For use please cite: von Borzyskowski, Inken and Wahman, Michael. "Systematic Measurement Error in Election Violence Data: Causes and Consequences" *British Journal of Political Science*.

preday_EV_ACLED

Label: ACLED pre-election violence

Indicates election-related violence in the constituency prior to election day (the six months before the election) or on election day according to ACLED. The data are extracted using GIS constituency shape files for Malawi and Zambia. The narrative associated with the violent episode was used to determine whether an event qualifies as election violence.

Source: Raleigh C, Linke A, Hegre H and Karlsen J (2010) Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(5): 1-10.

post_EV_ACLED

Label: ACLED post-election violence

Indicates election-related violence in the constituency in the post-election period (two weeks after the announcement of the election results) according to ACLED. The data is extracted using GIS constituency shape files for Malawi and Zambia. The narrative associated with the violent episode was used to determine whether an event qualifies as election violence.

Source: Raleigh C, Linke A, Hegre H and Karlsen J (2010) Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(5): 1-10.

preday_EV_SCAD

Label: SCAD pre-election violence

Indicates election-related violence in the constituency prior to election day (the six months before the election) or on election day according to SCAD. The data are extracted using GIS constituency shape files for Malawi and Zambia. We use the "issue" filter to demine whether the event is election related (issue=1).

Source: Salehyan I, Hendrix C, Hamner J, Case C, Linebarger C, Stull E and Williams J (2012) Social Conflict in Africa: A New Dataset." *International Interactions*, 38(4): 503-511

post_EV_SCAD

Label: SCAD post-election violence

Indicates election-related violence in the constituency in the post-election period (two weeks after the announcement of the election results) according to SCAD. The data are extracted

using GIS constituency shape files for Malawi and Zambia. We use the “issue” filter to demine whether the event is election related (issue=1).

Source: Salehyan I, Hendrix C, Hamner J, Case C, Linebarger C, Stull E and Williams J (2012) Social Conflict in Africa: A New Dataset.” *International Interactions*, 38(4): 503-511.

preday_EV_EITHER

Label: ACLED/SCAD combined pre-el. violence

Indicates whether either ACLED or SCAD records election-related violence in the pre-electoral period or on election day for a given constituency (see description above).

Source: Raleigh C, Linke A, Hegre H and Karlsen J (2010) Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(5): 1-10. Salehyan I, Hendrix C, Hamner J, Case C, Linebarger C, Stull E and Williams J (2012) Social Conflict in Africa: A New Dataset.” *International Interactions*, 38(4): 503-511.

post_EV_EITHER

Label: ACLED/SCAD combined post-el. violence

Indicates whether either ACLED or SCAD records election-related violence in the post-electoral period for a given constituency (see description above).

Source: Raleigh C, Linke A, Hegre H and Karlsen J (2010) Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(5): 1-10. Salehyan I, Hendrix C, Hamner J, Case C, Linebarger C, Stull E and Williams J (2012) Social Conflict in Africa: A New Dataset.” *International Interactions*, 38(4): 503-511.

consistency_predayACLED

Label: Consistency ACLED pre-election violence
Consistency between *preday_EV* and *preday_EV_ACLED*

consistency_postACLED

Label: Consistency ACLED post-election violence
Consistency between *post_EV* and *post_EV_ACLED*

consistency_predaySCAD

Label: Consistency SCAD pre-election violence
Consistency between *preday_EV* and *preday_EV_SCAD*

consistency_postSCAD

Label: Consistency SCAD post-election violence
Consistency between *post_EV* and *post_EV_SCAD*

consistency_predayEITHER

Label: Consistency ACLED/SCAD combined pre-election violence
Consistency between *preday_EV* and *preday_EV_EITHER*

consistency_postEITHER

Label: Consistency ACLED/SCAD combined post-election violence
Consistency between *post_EV* and *post_EV_EITHER*

Underreporting_PreACLED

Label: Underreporting ACLED pre-election violence
Violence indicated by *preday_EV* but not *preday_EV_ACLED*

Underreporting_PostACLED

Label: Underreporting ACLED post-election violence
Violence indicated by *post_EV* but not *post_EV_ACLED*

Underreporting_PreSCAD

Label: Underreporting SCAD pre-election violence
Violence indicated by *preday_EV* but not *preday_EV_SCAD*

Underreporting_PostSCAD

Label: Underreporting SCAD post-election violence
Violence indicated by *post_EV* but not *post_EV_SCAD*

Underreporting_PreEither

Label: Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined pre-election violence
Violence indicated by *preday_EV* but not *preday_EV_EITHER*

Underreporting_PostEither

Label: Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined post-election violence
Violence indicated by *post_EV* but not *post_EV_EITHER*

UnderreportingAnyViolPreACLED

Label: Underreporting ACLED pre-election ANY violence
Violence indicated by *preday_EV* but not *preday_ANY_ACLED*

UnderreportingAnyViolPostACLED

Label: Underreporting ACLED post-election ANY violence
Violence indicated by *post_EV* but not *post_ANY_ACLED*

UnderreportingAnyViolPreSCAD

Label: Underreporting SCAD pre-election ANY violence
Violence indicated by *preday_EV* but not *preday_ANY_SCAD*

UnderreportingAnyViolPostSCAD

Label: Underreporting SCAD post-election ANY violence

Violence indicated by *post_EV* but not *post_ANY_SCAD*

UnderreportingAnyViolPreEither

Label: Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined pre-election ANY violence

Violence indicated by *preday_EV* but not *preday_ANY_EITHER*

UnderreportingAnyViolPostEither

Label: Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined post-election ANY violence

Violence indicated by *post_EV* but not *post_ANY_EITHER*

preday_ANY_ACLED

Label: ACLED pre-election ANY violence

Same as *preday_EV_ACLED* but including non-election related violence events

preday_ANY_SCAD

Label: SCAD pre-election ANY violence

Same as *preday_EV_SCAD* but including non-election related violence events

preday_ANY_EITHER

Label: ACLED/SCAD pre-election ANY violence

Same as *preday_EITHER* but including non-election related violence events

PopulationDensity

Label: Population density

Inhabitants/km² divided by 10. Data from the Malawi (2008) and Zambia (2010) census aggregated to the constituency level for the authors by the National Statistics Office of Malawi and the Central Statistical Office of Zambia.

Source: Central Statistical Office of Zambia. 2010. *2010 Census of Population and Housing*. Lusaka: Zambia; National Statistics Office of Malawi. 2008. *2008 Census of Population and Housing*. Lilongwe: Malawi.

PopulationDensityLog

Label: Urbanization

PopulationDensity logged.

Source: Central Statistical Office of Zambia. 2010. *2010 Census of Population and Housing*. Lusaka: Zambia; National Statistics Office of Malawi. 2008. *2008 Census of Population and Housing*. Lilongwe: Malawi.

HistoryEV

Label: History of election violence

Indicates whether the constituency had widely reported violence in any of the previous elections based on SCAD and ACLED. We code history of election violence if the constituency had violence recorded in either SCAD or ACLED, using the same coding rules as in *preday_EV_ACLED*, *post_EV_ACLED*, *preday_EV_SCAD*, *post_EV_SCAD*.

Source: Raleigh C, Linke A, Hegre H and Karlsen J (2010) Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(5): 1-10. Salehyan I, Hendrix C, Hamner J, Case C, Linebarger C, Stull E and Williams J (2012) Social Conflict in Africa: A New Dataset." *International Interactions*, 38(4): 503-511

margin_percentPres

Label: Vote margin presidential election

Margin between winning presidential candidate and runner up in the constituency (expressed in percentage points) in the 2014 election.

Source: Malawi Electoral Commission

margin_percentPres2015

Label: Vote margin presidential election 2015

Margin between winning presidential candidate and runner up in the constituency (expressed in percentage points) in the 2015 election.

Source: Zambia Electoral Commission

margin_percentPres2016

Label: Vote margin presidential election 2016

Margin between winning presidential candidate and runner up in the constituency (expressed in percentage points) in the 2016 election.

Source: Zambia Electoral Commission

margin_percentPresPRE

Label: Vote margin presidential election

Same as *margins_percentPres* for Malawi and *margins_percentPres2015* for Zambia

margin_percentPresPOST

Label: Vote margin presidential election

Same as *margins_percentPres* for Malawi and *margins_percentPres2016* for Zambia

Literacy

Label: Literacy

Percent of people above the age of 18 who are literate. Data from the Malawi (2008) and Zambia (2010) census aggregated to the constituency level for the authors by the National Statistics Office of Malawi and the Central Statistical Office of Zambia.

Source: Central Statistical Office of Zambia. 2010. *2010 Census of Population and Housing*. Lusaka: Zambia; National Statistics Office of Malawi. 2008. *2008 Census of Population and Housing*. Lilongwe: Malawi.

Electification

Label: Electrification

Percent of households with electricity. Data from the Malawi (2008) and Zambia (2010) census aggregated to the constituency level for the authors by the National Statistics Office of Malawi and the Central Statistical Office of Zambia.

Source: Central Statistical Office of Zambia. 2010. *2010 Census of Population and Housing*. Lusaka: Zambia; National Statistics Office of Malawi. 2008. *2008 Census of Population and Housing*. Lilongwe: Malawi.

Nightlightlog

Label: Night lights

Mean luminosity score, divided by the land area (in km²). To produce the natural log we add 1 and take the natural log. Data from United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association's (NOAA) National Geographic Data Center have been aggregated to the constituency level by Boone (2016).

Source: Boone C (2016) Spatial Inequalities in African Political Economy Dataset. LSE RIIF 2016 (#1-BRD-B076).

Democracy

Label: Democracy

Polity IV Democracy scores

Source: Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2017). Polity iv project, political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2016. Center for Systemic Peace.

Competitiveness

Label: Competitiveness

Measured as 1-vote margin for the last presidential election

Source: Malawi Electoral Commission; Zambia Electoral Commission

DATASET 2: Borzyskowski Wahman Data for Figure A3.dta

Country_name

Label: Country Name

Country name

Year

Label: year

Year

v2elintim_osp

Label: Election government intimidation

Question: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

Responses: 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet. 1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period. 2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. 4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

Source: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig,

and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>

v2elpeace_osp

Label: Election other electoral violence

Question: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

Responses: 0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees. 1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily. 2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small. 3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured. 4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

Source: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>

DATASET 3: Borzyskowski Wahman Data for Figures A4-A7.dta

country_name

Label: Country name

Country name

MZ

Label: Malawi and Zambia Indicator

Coded 1 if the country is either Malawi or Zambia

v2x_polyarchy

Label: Electoral democracy index

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2x_freexp_altinf v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_elecoff Data release: 6-8. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_polyarchy = .5 * MPI + .5 * API = .5 * (v2x_elecoff * v2xel_frefair * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2x_freexp_altinf) + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel_frefair + (1/4) * v2x_frassoc_thick + (1/8) * v2x_suffr + (1/4) * v2x_freexp_altinf)$$

Source: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>

v2mecenefm

Label: Government Censorship effort-media

Question: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast

media?

Clarification: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery. We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, state-ments offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

Responses: 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine. 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues. 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues. 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such excep- tional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

Source: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lind- berg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Mar- quardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>

v2elintim_ord

Label: Election government intimidation

Question: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

Responses: 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet. 1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period. 2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. 4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of

opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Source: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lind-berg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>

v2elpeace_ord

Label: Election other electoral violence

Question: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

Responses: 0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees. 1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily. 2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small. 3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured. 4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Source: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lind-berg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>

e_areaLOG

Label: Area (logged)

Logged area in square kilometers

Source: Haber, S. & Menaldo, V. 2011. "Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse", *American Political Science Review* 105(1), 1–26. URL: <https://stephen-haber.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Haber-and-Menaldo-APSR-2011.pdf>

e_populationLOG

Label: Population size (logged)

Logged size of population

Source: Haber, S. & Menaldo, V. 2011. "Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse", *American Political Science Review* 105(1), 1–26. URL: <https://stephen-haber.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Haber-and-Menaldo-APSR-2011.pdf>

v2x_clphy

Label: Physical violence index

Question: To what extent is physical integrity respected?

Clarification: Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1). Source(s): v2cltort v2clkill Data release: 6-8.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom from torture (v2cltort) and freedom from political killings (v2clkill).

Source: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>